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Abstract Under open list proportional representation, voters vote both for a party and
for some candidates within its list (preferential vote). Seats are assigned to parties in
proportion to their votes and, within parties, to the candidates obtaining the largest
number of preferential votes. The paper examines how the number of candidates vot-
ers can vote for affects the representation of minorities in parliaments. I highlight a
clear negative relationship between the two. Minorities are proportionally represented
in parliament only if voters can cast a limited number of preferential votes. When the
number of preferential votes increases, a multiplier effect arises, which disproportion-
ately increases the power of the majority in determining the elected candidates.
1 Introduction
The label proportional representation (PR) refers to any multi-member district system
where seats are assigned to parties in proportion to the share of votes they receive.
An important distinction within this class of electoral systems relates to the rules
governing seat allocation within parties. Suppose a party running with a list of ten
candidates wins four seats in a district: which of the candidates on its list will be
elected? In some countries (among many others, Argentina, Israel, Spain and South
Africa), seat allocation follows a ranking of candidates that is determined by party
leaders before election. In the example, the first four candidates on the party list
would be assigned the seat under this system. Voters cannot modify the ranking and
can only cast a vote for a party list as a whole. In other countries (e.g. Belgium, The
Netherlands or Sweden), voters can affect the ranking decided by parties by casting
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a specific vote (a preferential or preference vote) for some candidates within the list.
Candidates obtaining enough preferential votes are elected independently of their
position on the original ranking. In the example, if, say, the tenth candidate on the list
received enough preferential votes, she would be elected in place of one of the first
four candidates. Finally, there are countries (e.g. Finland and Brazil) where rankings
are solely determined by preferential votes. Under this system, the four seats won
by the party in the example would be assigned to the four candidates obtaining the
highest number of individual votes. The three systems are known as closed, flexible (or
semi-open) and open list PR, respectively. It is important to remark that, under flexible
and open list PR, voters can cast a vote both for a party and for some candidates. The
party-vote is what differentiates these systems from limited vote.
Preferential votes under open list PR (and, to some extent, under flexible list PR)
are equivalent to approval voting within party lists: voters decide to approve (and not
rank) some of the politicians appearing on the ballot. Only one approval vote can be
cast for each candidate (no cumulative voting). The total number of approval votes that
can be expressed can vary a lot from country to country. For example, it is equal to one
in Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Brazil, it varies from one to five—depending on
the electoral district—in Greece and it coincides with the total number of candidates
on the list in Belgium.
This paper investigates the extent to which the interests of minority groups can be
protected under open list PR systems. As a measure of representation of minorities, I
consider the number of elected candidates representing the group.1 If minorities were
able to organize themselves into parties, the question would boil down to the analysis
of seat allocation across parties. The extent of minority representation would then
only depend on the mapping of votes into seats and on the presence (and level) of
minimum thresholds for representation. This is the focus of the literature on threshold
for representation and threshold for exclusion (among others, Rae et al. 1971; Lijphart
and Gibberd 1977; Taagepera 1998).2 However, party structures in countries using PR
systems might not necessarily represent the minority/majority divide. For example,
Huber (2012) shows that the “ethnicization” of voting behavior (i.e. the correlation
between voting decisions and individuals’ ethnicity) is actually lower under PR than
it is under first-past-the-post systems. In other words, ethnic groups often split their
votes across different parties and there might not be parties primarily receiving votes
from one specific ethnic group. This happens because, “although PR makes it possible
for ethnically oriented parties to form, it also makes it easy for non-ethnic parties
to compete for ethnic votes”.3 In such a scenario, then, minority candidates might
appear on party lists that represent different interests. The rules governing seat allo-
cation within party lists become of key importance to determine the level of minority
representation in this context.
1 The analysis therefore concerns the formal representation of minorities, as opposed to the substantial
representation (Pitkin 1967).
2 The two thresholds represent the minimum amount of votes a party should obtain to win a seat and the
maximum amount of votes that would not guarantee the seat to the party, respectively.
3 Huber (2012, p. 999).
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The paper considers a society divided in two groups of unequal size, that I call
minority and majority. Voters vote under open list PR: they must cast a vote for
one out of two parties and assign some preferential votes to candidates within its
list. Voters can only approve candidates belonging to the list of the party they voted
for and can cast at most one preferential vote per candidate. The seats won by the
party are assigned to the candidates in the list who received the largest number of
preferential votes. I assume list composition is dictated by the law: lists must contain
a share of candidates representing each group equal to the relative size of the group
in the population. Furthermore, I make a number of conservative assumptions on
voters’ characteristics. First, I assume that members of each group are perfectly able
to coordinate. This allows to consider a game between two players, the minority and the
majority.4 A similar degree of coordination is assumed in ethical voters models (Coate
and Conlin 2004; Feddersen and Sandroni 2006). Groups preferences are defined
on the minority/majority dimension: each group aims at maximizing the number of
elected candidates representing its interests. Voters are perfectly able to distinguish
minority and majority candidates. Finally, all candidates representing the same group
are identical and cannot campaign to attract votes from different groups.5 What I am
considering is therefore a best-case type of scenario.
Even under this scenario, my results show that minority representation can be very
limited under open list PR. In particular, the analysis highlights a clear negative rela-
tionship between the number of preferential votes and the number of elected candidates
representing the interests of the group. Perfectly proportional representation (a situ-
ation where the share of elected minority candidates is equal to the relative size of
the group in the population) is guaranteed only if voters can cast a small number of
preferential votes.
The intuition behind the negative correlation between number of preferential votes
and minority representation is as follows. An important characteristic of open list PR
is that candidates are guaranteed to be elected if the number of preferential votes they
receive is above a specific threshold. Guaranteed here means that their election is
independent of the total number of seats won by their party and the number of prefer-
ential votes obtained by other candidates. The threshold turns out to be proportional
to the number of preferential votes that can be expressed. When voters can cast few
preferential votes, the threshold is low. Then, the votes of the minority are enough to
guarantee that (the votes received by) some minority candidates pass the threshold.
The larger the number of preferential votes, the lower the ability of the minority to
cast enough votes on specific candidates and guarantee their election. Furthermore,
an increase in the number of preferential votes produces a “multiplier” effect on the
power of the majority. Assume the minority contains two individuals, while the major-
4 The pure strategy Nash equilibria of this two-player game are equivalent to Strong Nash equilibria
(Aumann 1959) of a game where each voter acts as a different player, when these equilibria exist.
5 A consistent literature has analyzed the difference between candidates’ behavior under open list and
closed list PR (Carey and Shugart 1995; Chang 2005; Shugart et al. 2005; Chang and Golden 2007; Ames
1995). The main conclusion is that open list PR increases the value of candidates’ personal reputation as
opposed to party reputation. This happens both because open list enhances intra-party competition and
electoral uncertainty (Carey and Shugart 1995; Chang 2005) and because it induces voters to focus more
on candidates’ characteristics and less on parties’ positions (Shugart et al. 2005).
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ity contains six. The difference between the total number of preferential votes that can
be expressed by the two groups is 4 if each individual can cast one preferential vote,
8 if they can cast two, 12 if three, etc. If the majority equally splits its votes across the
two parties, it will be able to give more and more preferential votes to more and more
majority candidates, eventually preventing the election of any minority candidate.
Even though ethnic politics versus class politics is a dilemma mostly in developing
countries,6 a similar dilemma exists in democratizing countries.7 Consider a society
divided along a class (i.e. income-related) dimension and an ethnic dimension. Suppose
that the two parties in my model are the party of the rich and the party of the poor.
When the poor of both ethnic groups prefer to channel their frustration through ethnic
politics, the relevant coalition is between the rich majority group and the poor majority
group, against the rich and poor minority groups. In this case, the scenario is similar
to the one I consider in my model.8 If the system is open list PR and many preferential
votes can be cast, the majority ethnic group will divide up optimally the votes across
parties, because its main goal is coordinating to defeat the minority group. Taking a
step back and considering the constitutional stage in a democratizing country, these
conclusions imply that an ethnic majority group might prefer to choose an open list PR
system with a large number of preferential votes. Whenever the ethnic politics cleavage
dominates the class cleavage, this system will allow to reduce the representation of
the minority group.
In the baseline model, parties are passive players. Given the quota system specified
by the law and the assumptions about candidates’ characteristics, they essentially can
play no role in deciding list composition. This very simplified and stylized scenario
constitutes a first step in the analysis of minority representation under open list PR
and allows to obtain clear and precise conclusions about the effect of the number
of preferential votes. In Sect. 4.1, I briefly discuss the possibility of endogenizing
list composition. I assume parties want to maximize the number of seats won and
can decide how many minority and majority candidates to include in their lists. Two
interesting insights emerge from this extension. First, contrary to what one would
expect, the incentives to include minority candidates in the list are weaker when few
preferential votes are allowed. Under reasonable assumptions on voting behavior in the
subgames, no equilibrium exists where both parties include minority candidates in their
lists. In addition, there can be an equilibrium where both parties only contain majority
candidates. When voters can cast a large number of preferential votes, these type of
equilibria are harder to sustain. Interestingly enough, the primary reason for including
minority candidates in the list is not to attract the votes of the minority. Indeed, when
the minority votes for a party and many preferential votes can be cast, the majority
6 Take for example the comparison between India and Indonesia suggested by Huber (2017): the two
countries have a similar level of ethnic diversity, but ethnic politics is much stronger in India than it is
in Indonesia. The interaction between economic and ethnic diversity play a crucial role in explaining this
difference.
7 For example, ethnic politics played a much more central role in Ukraine than it did in Georgia, despite a
similar level of ethnic diversity in the two countries (Huber 2017).
8 Thus, the presence of two different parties in my model implicitly represents a second cleavage in the
society. This cleavage becomes secondary when the minority/majority cleavage is particularly strong.
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always best responds by voting for that party too. The number of votes assigned to
the party by the group is strictly greater than the number of voters in the minority.
In this way, some majority candidates in the party receive an amount of preferential
votes that is strictly larger than the one received by any minority candidate, gaining
priority in the allocation of seats (the larger the amount of preferential votes that can
be expressed, the larger the number of such candidates and the lower the number of
elected minority ones). By including minority candidates in their lists, then, parties
are able to attract a consistent amount of votes by the majority.
The discussion in Sect. 4.1 confirms how the main analysis in the paper is conducted
under a best-case scenario for the minority. When list composition is dictated by the
law, the group can be represented in parliament only if the number of preferential votes
that can be expressed is small enough. In this case, however, parties have very low
incentives to actually include minority candidates in their lists. Overall, this strengthens
the conclusion that minority interests can be poorly protected under open list PR. The
results suggest that the best way to achieve perfect minority representation is to limit
the number of preferential votes that can be expressed and impose a system of quotas
on party lists.
A second important insight of Sect. 4.1 is that, if parties care about maximizing the
number of seats won, a situation in which only one party contains minority candidates
(or, in other words, the existence of a “minority party”) is unlikely to occur. Whenever
only one party contains minority candidates in its list, two possible incentives can
arise. First, the party might be tempted to replace the minority candidates with majority
ones to attract more votes by the majority. Second, the other party might be induced
to include minority candidates in its list too. When few preferential votes can be
expressed, both incentives can arise, depending on the specific assumptions one makes
about equilibria in the voting subgames. Equilibria with “minority parties” exist only
under very specific assumptions. When the number of preferential votes is large, only
the second effect arises.
As noted above, by assuming a cohesive minority behavior I am stacking the deck
against the results I obtain in the model. My results show that, even if the minority is
perfectly able to coordinate, open list PR can be associated with very limited minority
representation. Clearly, reducing the coordination power of the minority would only
strengthen this conclusion. On the other hand, reducing the coordination power of the
majority would probably result in higher minority representation. However, for a fixed
degree of coordination ability, the comparative statics on the effect of the number of
preferential votes would persist. The chances of electing a minority candidate in a
party decrease when (i) enough majority voters vote for that party and (ii) they give
enough preferential votes to their favorite candidates. Limiting the coordination ability
of the majority would affect both components. However, for a given probability that
enough majority voters vote for a party, an increase in the number of preferential votes
definitely increases the number of majority candidates obtaining a consistent amount
of votes. This reduces overall minority representation. Section 6.1 further discusses
this intuition and provides an illustrative example.
The negative correlation between minority representation and the number of pref-
erential votes had already been established for limited vote systems (Lijphart et al.
1986). In these systems, all candidates appear on the same ballot, voters do not cast
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a vote for parties and can only express preferential votes for candidates. The elected
candidates are those who received the largest number of votes. Open list PR there-
fore differs from limited vote because of the possibility to cast a vote for a party list.
The importance of my contribution with respect to the literature on limited vote stems
from two observations. The first is more practical. Open list PR is a much more widely
used electoral system than limited vote.9 Establishing how well minority interests are
protected under this system is therefore of great relevance. The second observation is
more technical: the presence of a party-vote in open list PR is a relevant difference
with respect to limited vote. Two effects come into play. First, while under limited
vote a candidate competes with all the other candidates, under open list PR she primar-
ily competes with the subset of politicians on the same party list. Most importantly,
the election of a minority candidate in a party is independent of the number of votes
received by candidates in the other party. This limits the power of the majority to
reduce minority representation: while under limited vote it is enough to assign enough
votes to many majority candidates, under open list PR the group must assign enough
votes to many candidates in both parties. The second effect arises from party behavior.
Under open list PR, parties have stronger incentives to include minority candidates in
their lists. The intuition is explained in Sect. 5 with the help of an example. The two
effects combined imply a (relatively) better performance of open list PR in protecting
minority interests.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 contains the results. Section 4 extends the analysis to endogenous list forma-
tion and larger number of parties. This is followed by a comparison between open list
PR and limited vote (Sect. 5). Section 6 discusses the assumption of perfect coordina-
tion and provides an example about class- versus ethnic-identity. Section 7 concludes.
All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 The model
Consider a country whose total voting population is V . Voters are divided in two
groups: a minority, m, and a majority, M . Let Vj denote the number of voters in each
group j ∈ {m, M}, with Vm < V/2 and Vm + VM = V . During an election, voters
must choose S representatives in a unique electoral district. There are 2S candidates,
equally divided in two party lists, A and B. I assume the law requires each list to
contain candidates representing both groups, in proportion to the size of the group in
the population. For simplicity, I set V = S, so that each list must contain Vm minority
candidates and VM majority candidates (I discuss this assumption more in detail in
footnote 11, once I have introduced the electoral system). Parties and candidates do
not make any strategic decision and the only players in the game are the two groups
of voters.10
9 The system is used to elect the Spanish Senate, Gibraltar’s House of Assembly and in some local-level
elections in the United States.
10 When parties are not active players in the model, list length is an exogenous parameter. Here, I am fixing
it to S, to allow both parties to contain “enough” candidates of each type in their lists. I believe any other
choice would be as arbitrary as this one, but probably harder to justify. One option could be to assume that
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Under open list PR, each voter must (i) vote for a party and (ii) express up to
π ∈ {1, . . . , S} preferential votes for candidates within its list. Voters cannot cast
more than one preferential vote per candidate and cannot vote for candidates outside
the party list they voted for. I assume groups act as unique and cohesive players. More
precisely, each group j ∈ {m, M} must decide (i) an assignment of votes vPj to each
party P ∈ {A, B}, such that vAj + vBj = Vj and (ii) for each of the vPj voters of
group j voting for party P , an allocation of (up to) π preferential votes across the S
candidates in P , satisfying the property that no voter casts more than one vote for the
same candidate.
The final composition of the parliament is then determined in two steps. First, seats
are assigned to parties in proportion to the votes received. Given the amount of votes
vPm and vPM assigned by each group to party P , the party wins S P = vPm + vPM seats11.
In the second step, the S P seats won by party P are assigned to the candidates (in P’s
list) that have obtained the largest number of preferential votes. Ties are broken by
assigning the seat to each entitled candidate with equal probability.
The groups care about the final composition of the parliament and want to maximize
the number of candidates representing their interests. Let Cm denote the set of all
minority candidates running for election (with |Cm | = 2Vm) and by W the set of
elected candidates (with |W | = S). The set of elected minority candidates is therefore
Wm = Cm ∩ W . I define minority representation (M R) as the cardinality of this set:
M R = |Wm |. I say that minority representation is (perfectly) proportional, or that the
minority is perfectly represented, whenever M R = Vm . Groups’ preferences can be
expressed as
Um = M R
UM = S − M R
3 Results
As a preliminary observation, notice that it is a weakly dominated strategy for a
group to vote for candidates representing the other group. For any strategy played by
the majority, voting for a majority candidate either has no effect on the number of
minority candidates elected, or it strictly decreases it. The symmetric reasoning holds
for the majority. In the analysis that follows, I do not consider this type of strategies.
The following lemma contains a first, important observation about open list PR.
Lemma 1 In open list PR, receiving π votes is a sufficient condition for a candidate
to be elected.
Footnote 10 continued
one party contains exactly and only Vm candidates. As I already argued in Sect. 1, however, this is not the
right type of assumption in this setting. Furthermore, the existence of minority parties is hard to sustain in
equilibrium when parties play a more active role (Sect. 4.1).
11 A more general formulation would assume that the total number of voters is V > S, that a party wins
one seat every q = V/S votes received and that unallocated seats are distributed to the party with the largest
remainder (Largest Remainder Method). Setting V = S allows to disregard remainders and is equivalent
to assuming that each of the V voters represents a group of q individuals.
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A formal proof of the lemma is contained in the Appendix. Intuitively, as there are
V party-votes and π preferential votes per voter, a total of πV preferential votes will
be cast. As S = V , winning π preferential votes directly implies that a candidate wins
a seat.12
A direct consequence of Lemma 1 is that perfectly proportional minority represen-
tation is guaranteed whenever π ≤ Vm . When π is in this range, indeed, the minority
is always able to assign π preferential votes to Vm candidates within the same party.
Clearly, since π ≤ Vm implies π ≤ VM , an identical reasoning proves that the majority
can always guarantee the election of VM majority candidates. The number of elected
minority candidates therefore never exceeds the perfectly proportional one.
Proposition 1 In open list PR, the minority is proportionally represented in parlia-
ment (M R = Vm) whenever π ≤ Vm.
The outcome described in Proposition 1 can arise from multiple equilibria. In par-
ticular, all mixed strategy profiles where group j ∈ {m, M} assigns all its votes to one
party with probability p j are (outcome-equivalent) equilibria of the game. Extreme
cases include those where p j = 1 or p j = 0 for both groups (one party winning all
the votes), and those where p j = 1 and p j ′ = 0 (each party receiving all and only the
votes of one group). More refined mixed strategy profiles (for example, completely
mixed ones) can constitute equilibria as long as they guarantee that Vm minority can-
didates and VM majority ones are elected in expectations. This strictly depends on the
assumptions about the size of the two groups and the value of π .
Let me now turn to the case of π > Vm . A first, immediate observation is that
increasing the number of preferential votes can never improve the representation of
the minority in parliament. As before, the majority can always guarantee the election of
at least VM candidates, limiting the maximum number of elected minority candidates
to Vm . When π ∈ {Vm, . . . , VM }, the result follows immediately from Lemma 1, as
discussed above. When π > VM , by voting for exactly the same VM candidates, the
majority can assign VM preferential votes to each of them, which is more than what any
minority candidate can receive. This ensures the election of VM majority candidates.
As a matter of fact, the minority is strictly harmed by an increase in the number of
preferential votes. Consider the following example.
Example 1 Let Vm = 1 and VM = 4. When π = 1, Proposition 1 guarantees M R = 1.
Now let π = 3 and consider the following voting behavior by the majority: (i) party-
votes are equally divided between A and B (vAM = vBM = 2) and (ii) for every party
P , the 2 voters voting for it cast their preferential votes for the same three majority
candidates. Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration. The strategy guarantees that
three majority candidates in each party receive two preferential votes. Now consider
the best response by the minority voter. Assume he votes for party A and assigns his
preferential vote to the only minority candidate in the party. Then, A wins S A = 3
seats, and these will be assigned to the 3 candidates receiving the most preferential
votes. These are all majority candidates. As the same conclusion holds if the minority
voter votes for B, no minority candidate will be elected in equilibrium.
12 I thank an anonymous referee for this simple and intuitive version of the proof.
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A B
SA = 3 SB = 2
vBM = 2v
A
M = 2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
vAm = 1
Fig. 1 Graphical representation of Example 1. The two columns represent party A’s and B’s lists. Each of
the small rectangles represents a candidate, with minority candidates shaded in gray. On the side of each
party list, I report the number of voters voting for it: party A receives votes from two majority voters and
one minority voter, party B only receives two votes from the majority. When π = 3, each of the majority
voters can vote for three candidates, so that both A and B will contain three majority candidates receiving
two preferential votes (the number of votes received by each candidate is marked inside the corresponding
rectangle). If the minority voter votes for party A, the three seats won by the party will be won by majority
candidates
Proposition 2 Let VM = 2(Vm + 1). In open list PR, minority representation is
decreasing in π whenever π > Vm. More precisely,
M R(π) ≤ max{Vm − (π − VM/2), 0}. (1)
Inequality (1) generalizes the intuition behind Example 1: (the upper bound for) minor-
ity representation decreases (with respect to its perfectly proportional level, Vm) when
the majority can vote for a number of candidates strictly larger than the number of
seats it assigns to parties by equally splitting its votes between them, i.e. π > VM/2.
As for Proposition 1, there are many strategy profiles leading to the equilibrium
outcome described in Proposition 2. The equilibrium strategy of the majority in this
case is however fixed: the group must assign exactly half of the votes to each of the
parties. Failing to do so would result in a positive probability that a minority candidate
is elected. The multiplicity of equilibria then arises from the behavior of the minority.
As before, assigning all the votes to one party with probability pm is an equilibrium
strategy, for all pm ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 2 considers a specific size for the two groups. The case of a larger
relative size of the majority (VM > 2(Vm + 1)) is of limited interest: it seems clear
that, in this case, minority representation would decrease even faster when π increases.
A more interesting case is the one of a relatively small majority, VM < 2(Vm + 1).
Consider a modified version of Example 1.
Example 2 Let Vm = 1, VM = 3 and π = 3. This is illustrated in Fig. 2. Assume
the minority voter votes for party A and assigns his preferential vote to the minority
candidate in the party. The best response of the majority is to allocate two votes to A
and one to B (vAM = 2, vBM = 1). Indeed, if the two voters voting for A distribute their
preferential votes across the same three candidates, these will be the only winners of
the S A = 3 seats obtained by the party. In party B, three majority candidates receive
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A B
SA = 3 SB = 1
vBM = 1v
A
M = 2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
vAm = 1
A B
SA = 2 SB = 2
vBM = 1v
A
M = 2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
vAm = 1
Fig. 2 Graphical representation of Example 2. If the minority assigns its vote to party A (top figure), the
best response by the majority is to assign two votes to A and one to B and let the two A-voters vote for the
three majority candidates. However, given this strategy by the majority, the best response by the minority
is to assign its vote to B (bottom figure)
one preferential vote and each of them will be elected with probability 1/3. Under this
strategy profile then, M R = 0. However, it cannot be an equilibrium. Given the strategy
played by the majority, the minority voter strictly prefers to vote for B: this allows the
minority candidate in the party to receive one preferential vote and to compete with
the other three majority candidates for the assignment of two seats. Thus, a minority
candidate will be elected with probability 1/2. The absence of an equilibrium in pure
strategies now becomes evident: if the minority voter votes for B, the majority prefers
a strategy that is symmetric to the one described before (vAM = 1, vBM = 2), to which
the minority voter would in turn best respond by voting for A. The (mixed strategy)
equilibrium of the game involves the two players randomizing between their two
strategies with equal probability, and leads to an outcome where a minority candidate
is elected with probability 0.25.
Proposition 3 In open list PR, minority representation is weakly decreasing in π
whenever π > Vm and VM < 2(Vm + 1). More precisely,
– If VM = 2Vm + 1, then
E [M R(π)] = 1
2
(2Vm + 1 − min{π, VM }) + V
2
m
Vm + min{π, VM } (2)
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– If VM < 2Vm + 1, then
E [M R(π)] = 1
2
(3Vm + 1 − min{π, VM }) (3)
where E[M R(π)] denotes the equilibrium expected minority representation.
The qualitative result found in Proposition 2 therefore does not change: increasing
the number of preferential votes goes against the interest of the minority. However,
(expected) minority representation never reaches zero. When π ≥ VM , (2) and (3)
become
E [M R(VM )] = V
2
m
3Vm + 1 > 0 (2
′)
E [M R(VM )] = 12 (3Vm + 1 − VM ) > 0 (3
′)
respectively. As one would expect, minority representation is decreasing in the relative
size of the majority. Using (3′), one can see that E [M R(VM )] = Vm when VM = Vm +
1. At the opposite extreme, when VM = 2Vm + 1, (2′) implies that E [M R(VM )] <
Vm/3.
4 Extensions
4.1 Endogenous party list composition
Assume the number of minority candidates in each list is not set by law and parties
are free to decide list composition. This introduces two new players in the game, (the
leader of) party A and (the leader of) party B. Assume their only goal is to maximize
the number of seats won. A first, natural question to ask is whether the list composition
I assumed in the benchmark model can be sustained in equilibrium. For simplicity,
let me assume that party leaders can only decide whether to include Vm minority
candidates or not in their lists.13 Also, let me focus on the two polar cases of π ≤ Vm
and π = S. Considering more refined strategies and intermediate values of π would
consistently decrease the tractability of the analysis and conclusions would very likely
depend on specific assumptions on the size of the two groups.
Assume both party lists initially contain Vm minority candidates and let π ≤ Vm . As
noted above, many voting equilibria can arise in this subgame. While they all lead to
the same outcome in terms of minority representation, they differ in the number of seats
obtained by each party. Equilibrium restrictions in the voting subgame therefore matter
a lot for the conclusions. The same holds for equilibrium outcomes in the subgame
13 Parties cannot choose list length. When candidates can be placed on lists at no cost, the assumption is not
very restrictive, as there is no situation in which a party could benefit by reducing the number of candidates
it includes in its list.
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where only one party contains minority candidates. In general, one can always find
conditions on voting behavior that ensure the existence of equilibria with both parties
containing minority candidates. However, this type of equilibrium fails to exist under
reasonable assumptions. For example, assume that, if only one party contains majority
candidates, it obtains all the votes of the majority. This is the case if, everything else
being equal, the group prefers to vote for the party that “best represents” its interests.
Then, (at least) one party has incentives to replace the Vm minority candidates with
majority ones.
Now assume π = S. Even if one party removes the Vm minority candidates, it will
never be able to attract all the votes of the majority. The minority will vote for the other
party and, in turn, this will attract some of the votes of the majority (exactly half in
the case of Proposition 2), who aims at preventing the election of minority candidates
in the party. The deviating party therefore strictly decreases the number of seats won.
The existence of equilibria where both parties contain Vm candidates in their lists is
therefore easier to sustain when π is large.
The opposite question one can ask is whether equilibria where no party contains
minority candidates can exist. In line with the intuition above, this is more likely
for small values of π (although, as before, this type of equilibria do not exist under
specific restrictions on voting behavior). Sufficient conditions for the existence of an
equilibrium with no minority candidates in party lists are that (i) equilibrium behavior
in this subgame results in both parties obtaining half of the seats and (ii) the majority
casts all its votes for one party whenever this is the only party containing majority
candidates. Under these assumptions, no party would be willing to include a minority
candidate in its lists when the other does not. The opposite holds when π is large and
the intuition is the same as before: attracting the votes of the minority helps to attract
the votes of the majority too.
Combined together, the answers to the two questions show that incentives to include
minority candidates in party lists are stronger when π is large. This is somewhat
surprising. Given the results in Sect. 3, one would expect these incentives to be stronger
for small values of π . If the minority can guarantee the election of some candidates
with their votes, parties should be more likely to target the group. These incentives look
much weaker for the case of large π , where the power of the minority is consistently
reduced. As it turns out, this intuition is misleading. The willingness of the majority
to prevent the election of minority candidates acts as a powerful force and induces
parties to include (some) minority candidates in their lists.
Finally, this simple framework can be used to answer an additional question: can
there be equilibria with one “minority party”? This would be a situation where only
one party contains minority candidates. Let this party be A. There are two possible
reasons why this configuration might not be part of an equilibrium. First, party A might
have incentives to replace the minority candidates with majority ones. Second, party
B might want to add minority candidates in its list. For π ≤ Vm , the profitability of
the two deviations depends, again, on equilibrium restrictions in the voting subgames.
Just consider the following two examples. First, let the majority vote for party B (the
“fully majoritarian” party), so that party A obtains only Vm seats. Also, assume that
when no party contains minority candidates, each of them gets half of the votes. In
this case, party A can profitably deviate by replacing the minority candidates with
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majority ones. Alternatively, assume the majority votes for A as well and the party
obtains more than half of the seats. Then party B might have incentives to include Vm
candidates in its list too. This is a profitable deviation if, among the equilibria arising
in a voting subgame where both parties contain Vm minority candidates, one selects
those in which seats are equally shared.
When π is large, a “minority party” can never exist. The driving forces are the same
as before: (both) parties need minority candidates to attract the votes of the majority. If
only party A contains minority candidates, it will obtain the votes of the minority and
many votes of the majority. Party B has therefore incentives to include some minority
candidates in its list, to attract the votes of the two groups.
As a side note, notice that this reasoning rules out the existence of “pure minority
parties”, i.e. those containing exactly and only Vm minority candidates. For party A in
the example, including majority candidates in the list strictly increases the number of
seats won, as it allows to attract more votes from the majority. A pure minority party
could only exist in my model if parties were not purely interested in maximizing the
number of seats won.
The simple framework considered here clearly does not claim to be an exhaustive
description of party behavior under open list PR. However, it suggests an interesting
conclusion: imposing a quota on the number of minority candidates that must appear
on party lists can only help the interest of the minority. When π is small, party decisions
are likely to reduce minority representation, by reducing the availability of minority
candidates in their lists. On the contrary, parties seem to have larger incentives to
include minority candidates when π is large. Given the conclusions obtained in the
previous section, however, the minority is never able to benefit from it. Notice that this
reinforces the conclusions obtained in the previous section: at the constitutional stage
during a transitions to democracy, a majority ethnic group in an ethnically divided
society may have incentives to choose open list PR with large π .
4.2 Number of parties
Proportional representation systems are usually associated with the existence of mul-
tiple parties. The results contained in Lemma 1 and, as a consequence, in Proposition 1
are independent of the number of parties one considers (as long as list composition
is decided by the law as in the baseline model). The presence of more than two par-
ties would definitely enlarge the set of equilibria having M R = Vm as an outcome,
but would not limit the ability of the minority to ensure the election of their favorite
candidates.
The conclusions in Proposition 2 hinge on the possibility for the majority to assign
a large number of votes to all parties. In presence of more than two parties, therefore,
the relative size of the majority should be even larger for the result to hold. If, for
example, the number of parties was equal to three, the intuition behind Proposition 2
would still hold if VM ≥ 3(Vm + 1): the majority could assign Vm + 1 votes to each
of the three parties and, as π increases, cast a large number of preferential votes to
more and more candidates. More generally, a sufficient condition for the equivalent
of Proposition 2 to hold in presence of N > 2 parties is that VM ≥ N (Vm + 1).
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Proposition 4 Assume there are N > 2 parties in the country. When π > Vm,
VM ≥ N (Vm + 1) is a sufficient condition to have
M R(π) ≤ max{Vm − (π − VM/N ), 0} (4)
For a fixed size of the majority, then, a larger number of parties makes it more difficult
for the group to prevent the election of minority candidates. Given that PR systems
are typically associated with the existence of many parties, this partially mitigates the
negative results obtained in the previous sections.
The case of a “small” majority (Proposition 3) is not as straightforward to analyze
and I can only formulate conjectures about it. As before, the majority wants to con-
centrate enough votes on the party chosen by the minority, while the minority will try
to differentiate its vote as much as possible from the one of majority. The equilibrium
will be in mixed strategies. For some combinations of the pure strategies played with
positive probability in equilibrium, the two groups will vote for different parties and
some minority candidates will be elected. For some other combinations instead, the
majority will concentrate enough votes on the party the minority is voting for and
will be able to prevent the election of (some) minority candidates. The larger π , the
lower the number of minority candidates elected in this scenario. Expected minority
representation is probably increasing in the number of parties, as this increases the
opportunity for the minority to vote for a different party than the majority. However,
for a fixed number of parties, the comparative statics on π should not change.
5 Limited vote versus open list PR
As discussed in Sect. 1, an increase in the number of preferential votes produces the
same effect under limited vote and open list PR. This section highlights the differences
between the two systems. The possibility to cast a party-vote under open list PR turns
out to play a fundamental role.
When π is small, the election of minority candidates is guaranteed under both
systems. Similarly, when π is very large and the two groups consistently differ in their
sizes (as in Proposition 2), no systems will guarantee any positive level of minority
representation. However, in presence of a “small” majority (as in Proposition 3), the
two systems produce substantial differences when many preferential votes can be
expressed.
Consider Example 2 again. Under open list PR, a minority candidate wins a seat
with probability 0.25. Now assume the eight candidates in the two parties compete
under limited vote. Voters face a ballot containing two minority candidates and six
majority ones and must cast a preferential vote for three of them. If majority voters
assign their votes to the same four majority candidates, these will receive (at least)
two votes each. As minority candidates can receive at most one vote, none of them has
a positive probability of being elected. Thus, minority representation would be zero
under limited vote.
The presence or absence of party lists is therefore key. Under open list PR, can-
didates are divided in two groups that only partially compete against each other. The
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election of a minority candidate in one party is independent of the number of preferen-
tial votes obtained by majority candidates in the other. In order to completely prevent
the election of minority candidates, then, the majority should be able to assign enough
votes to its favorite candidates in both lists. This imposes stronger constraints on the
size of the majority than those imposed by limited vote.
Open list PR also produces different incentives for parties to include minority can-
didates in their lists. In Sect. 4.1, I discussed how a situation where no party contains
minority candidates is very unlikely to occur under open list PR with large π . In
addition, whenever a party contains some minority candidates, the other party has
incentives to include some too. The same is not true under limited vote. Again, Exam-
ple 2 provides a good intuition. For open list PR, assume party B does not contain
any minority candidate in its list. Then, by including one minority candidate, party A
can attract the votes of the minority and two votes by the majority. This is because
by setting vAM = 2, the majority can assign two preferential votes to three candidates,
preventing the election of the minority one. Thus, party A strictly benefits from intro-
ducing the minority candidate in its list. Now consider the equivalent situation under
limited vote. Assume all of the eight candidates on the ballot are majority candidates.
Would a party be able to increase the number of seats won by replacing some of those
candidates with minority ones? As long as at least four majority candidates remain
on the ballot, no minority candidate would have any chance of being elected. Then, a
party can never gain by including more minority candidates.
Combining the two insights, one can conclude that open list PR performs relatively
better than limited vote in protecting the interest of the minority. The two systems
produce equivalent results for extreme cases (small π or large π with large major-
ity). However, open list PR guarantees a positive expected minority representation
for smaller sizes of the majority and creates higher incentives for parties to include
minority candidates in their lists.
6 Discussion
6.1 Coordination
As noted in Sect. 1, the paper makes a list of assumptions guaranteeing a highly
coordinated and cohesive behavior by the two groups. This section explores the con-
sequences of assuming lower degrees of coordination. If the minority did not behave
as cohesive group, it would only decrease its chances to elect representatives that act
in its interest. This would only reinforce my conclusions on the limited ability of open
list PR to protect minority interests.
A less cohesive majority would probably increase the chances of electing minority
candidates. However, the comparative static results on the effect ofπ would not change.
The key intuition is the following: a less coordinated majority would have lower
chances of being able to target its votes to the same party the minority voted for.
This would therefore reduce the ability to prevent the election of minority candidates.
However, with strictly positive probability, the majority will still assign enough votes
to the same party supported by the minority. Increases in π reduce the probability that
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a minority candidate is elected in those scenarios, therefore reducing overall minority
representation. The following illustrative example assumes no coordination power for
the majority and a completely non-strategic behavior by voters within it. It shows that,
even in this limit case, (expected) minority representation is decreasing in π .
Example 3 Let Vm = 1 and VM = 3. Assume the majority does not act as a cohesive
group and each voter in the group behaves completely non-strategically. More pre-
cisely, let each of them vote for party A with probability ρ. Furthermore, assume they
distribute their preferential votes randomly across majority candidates in the party
they voted for.14 The minority is still assumed to be a cohesive and strategic group,
as in the benchmark model. Without loss of generality, let the minority voter vote
for party A and for the minority candidate in its list. When π = 1, the candidate
is elected for sure by Lemma 1. When π = 2, the probability that the candidate is
elected depends on how many majority voters vote for party A and on how they dis-
tribute their preferential votes. If no majority voter votes for A or if all of them do,
the minority candidate is elected for sure. If only one majority voter votes for A, the
candidate is elected with probability 2/3: party A wins two seats and contains three
candidates (the minority candidate and two majority ones) receiving one preferential
vote. If two majority candidates vote for A, they can distribute their preferential votes
in two possible ways: with probability 1/3, they give two preferential votes to two
majority candidates and none to the third; with probability 2/3, they give two votes
to one candidate and one to the other two. In the first case, the minority candidate
is elected for sure. In the second, she is elected with probability 1/3. Combining all
these considerations, expected minority representation for π = 2 is
E [M R(2)] = ρ3 + (1 − ρ)3 + 2
3
(
3
1
)
ρ(1 − ρ)2 +
(
3
2
)
ρ2(1 − ρ)
(
1
3
+ 2
3
· 1
3
)
Now assume π = 3. As before, the minority candidate is elected for sure when
no majority voter votes for A or all of them do. When only one voter votes for A,
the minority candidate wins with probability 1/2 as she competes with three other
candidates for the assignment of two seats. Finally, when two majority voters vote for
A, they assign two preferential votes to all majority candidates in the party and the
minority candidate has no chances of being elected. Expected minority representation
in this case is then
E [M R(3)] = (1 − ρ)3 + 1
2
(
3
2
)
ρ(1 − ρ)2 + ρ3
It is immediate to see that E [M R(1)] > E [M R(2)] > E [M R(3)].
14 In the example, voters are still perfectly able to distinguish minority from majority candidates. Relaxing
this assumption would considerably complicate the analysis, as it would require to consider all the possible
combinations of preferential votes that a group of majority voters can cast for candidates in a party. As
long as majority voters can distinguish majority candidates with sufficiently high probability, however, the
conclusions would not change.
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Table 1 Distribution of
individuals across class- and
ethnic-identity
M m
r 1 1
p 5 1
6.2 Ethnic politics versus class politics
Consider again the ethnic politics versus class politics dilemma discussed in Sect. 1.
In this section, I discuss how my model can be applied to a society that is divided
along both dimensions. I provide an example inspired by Huber (2017). Individuals in
the society have two “identities”: a class-identity, referring to their income level, and
an ethnic-identity. Assume there are two possible class-identities, rich (r ) and poor
(p), and two possible ethnic-identities, majority (M) and minority (m). This defines
four possible groups: the rich majority, the rich minority, the poor majority and the
poor minority. Table 1 shows an hypothetical distribution of eight voters across the
different identities. Rows represent class-identity, columns represent ethnic-identity.
Each cell in the table then contains the number of individuals belonging to each of the
four groups.
There exist two parties, the party of the rich (R) and the one of the poor (P).
Each party also contains two minority candidates and six majority ones. The electoral
system is open list PR, exactly as in the baseline model. Assume voters care about two
goals: (i) they want the party representing their class-identity to win the majority of the
seats in parliament; and (ii) they want to maximize the number of elected candidates
representing their ethnic-identity. Assume also that voters in the poor majority group
are perfectly able to coordinate. In this scenario, what would be the voting equilibrium
for different values of π?
Start by considering π ≤ 2. If one focuses only on strategies that are not weakly
dominated, voting according to class-identity (i.e. all the rich voting for party R and
all the poor voting for party P) is the only equilibrium in this case. Party P wins the
majority of the seats (6) and two minority candidates are elected, one in each party. No
voter has an incentive to change voting behavior: they are all voting for their favorite
party and no deviation can increase the number of elected candidates representing an
ethnic group.15
Now assume π = 8. If voters purely voted according to their class-identity, as in
the equilibrium just described, no minority candidate would be elected in party P: the
poor majority group would be able to assign five preferential votes to all the majority
candidates in the party. In party R, the two minority candidates would compete with
the majority candidates for the assignment of two seats. A minority candidate would
be elected with probability 1/4. In this scenario, the poor minority voter would prefer
to vote “ethnically” for party R. This would not affect the chances of party P winning
the majority of seats, but would guarantee the election of two minority candidates
15 If weakly dominated strategies are allowed, the strategy profile such that all minority voters vote for
party R and all majority voters vote for party P is also an equilibrium. As in the baseline model, the two
equilibria are outcome-equivalent in terms of minority representation.
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in party R. A similar reasoning shows that a pure “ethnic-voting” equilibrium might
not exist when ethnic considerations are strong enough. Assume all minority voters
vote for party R and all majority voters vote for party P . The outcome would be the
same as for the case of small π : party P would win the majority of the seats and two
minority candidates would be elected in party R. In this scenario, the poor minority
group might prefer to assign two votes to party R: this would make the two parties
tie, but would strictly decrease the number of elected minority candidates. If ethnic-
politics dominates class-politics, this a profitable deviation. Under similar conditions,
the equilibrium in this voting game is such that all voters vote for their favorite party,
except for two poor-majority voters, who vote for party R (or, in other words, the
majority equally splits its votes across the two parties). This creates a tie between the
two parties but prevents the election of any minority candidate.
The example perfectly replicates the results contained in the main section of the
paper. Under open list PR with small π , the interest of the minority are always pro-
tected, even if voters vote according to their class-identity. When π is large however,
a stronger ethnic-identity would induce the majority to disregard class interests and
optimally distribute its votes across different parties, in order to limit the representation
of minorities. This conclusion is of particular relevance if one considers the constitu-
tional stage in a democratizing country. A class-based ruling majority would prefer
to adopt an open list PR with small π . However, an ethnic-based ruling majority will
always set π very large: whenever ethnic-identity is predominant in the society, this
allows the group to consistently limit the representation of minorities in parliament.
7 Conclusions
The paper contributes to the literature on the impact of electoral systems on minority
representation. In particular, it studies the relationship between the number of candi-
dates voters can vote for under open list PR and the representation of minorities in
parliament. I consider a society divided in two groups, whose goal is to elect as many
candidates representing their interests as possible. Voters can vote for a party and,
within the party, can express some preferential votes for individual candidates. Seats
are first allocated across parties in proportion to the votes received and then within
parties to the candidates obtaining the largest number of preferential votes.
My results show that an increase in the number of preferential votes that can be
cast by voters reduces the representation of minorities in parliament. This is because
of a multiplier effect: when more preferential votes are allowed for each individual,
the total number of votes the majority can use increases more than the one for the
minority. Thus, the majority can always assign more votes to more candidates.
Most of the assumptions made in the model are conservative ones. They allow
for a clean and simple analysis of a situation where minorities are unable to create
their own parties. The groups must therefore rely on the possibility to elect candidates
representing their interests in parties containing many other different candidates. This
is the only situation in which the number of preferential votes to be expressed matters
for minority representation. Results show how this can be very limited even in the
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most favorable situation for the minority. Relaxing many of the assumptions I make
would therefore only worsen the outcome.
The result of the paper is in line with what was already proven for limited vote
systems. However, the possibility to cast a party-vote under open list PR turns out
to have a significant impact. More precisely, minority representation seems to be
(relatively) better protected under open list PR. This is because the system limits the
power of the majority to prevent the election of minority candidates and provides
higher incentives to parties to let minority candidates run.
An interesting application of the model helps drawing conclusions on the design
of electoral systems in countries that are transitioning to democracy. When the ethnic
division in a society is particularly strong, majority ethnic groups prefer to allow
many preferential votes to be expressed. This helps the groups to reduce the power of
opposing minorities.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 Assume a candidate c ∈ P receives π preferential votes. Since no
voter can cast more than one preferential vote for the same candidate, at least π voters
must be voting for P and S P ≥ π . Candidate c faces a positive probability of not being
elected only if at least S P other candidates in party P receive at least π preferential
votes. Thus, there must be at least π + 1 candidates in P receiving at least π votes.
As no voter can vote for more than π candidates, this is only possible if at least π + 1
voters vote for P . Thus, S P ≥ π + 1. Candidate c then faces a positive probability of
not being elected only if there are at least π + 1 other candidates receiving at least π
votes. Then, at least π + 2 candidates in P must be receiving at least π votes. By the
same reasoning used before, this implies that at least π +2 individuals must be voting
for P and S P ≥ π + 2. Applying the same reasoning enough times, one finds that c’s
probability of not being elected is strictly positive only if S P ≥ S, a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2 Assume the majority plays the following strategy: (i) vAM =
vBM = VM/2 and (ii) for each party P , the vPM voters voting for it assign their pref-
erential votes to the same min{VM , π} candidates, where the minimum is introduced
to exclude the possibility that majority voters vote for minority candidates when
π > VM . Each party therefore contains min{VM , π} majority candidates receiving
VM/2 = Vm +1 preferential votes. This is more than what any minority candidate can
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obtain (Vm). Consider any assignment of votes to parties by the minority (vAm, vBm).
Each party P wins S P = VM/2+vPm seats, and the number of elected majority candi-
dates in the party will be min{S P , VM , π} = min{S P , π}, since S P < VM . Minority
candidates will win any residual seat, so that
M R = S − min{S A, π} − min{SB, π} (5)
To complete the proof, it remains to be proven that
S − min{S A, π} − min{SB, π} ≤ max{Vm − (π − VM/2), 0} (6)
Notice that, if π ≥ max{S A, SB},
S − min{S A, π} − min{SB, π} = S − S A − SB = 0
and (6) is always satisfied. If π ≤ min{S A, SB}, then
S − min{S A, π} − min{SB, π} = S − 2π ≤ Vm − (π − VM/2)
whenever π ≥ VM/2 = Vm + 1. Finally, if S P < π < S P ′ ,
S − min{S A, π} − min{SB, π} = S − S P − π ≤ Vm − (π − VM/2)
since S P ≥ VM/2 by definition.
Proof of Proposition 3 First of all, notice that the only rationalizable strategies for
the minority must be such that vPm = Vm and vP ′m = 0 for some P, P ′ ∈ {A, B},
P = P ′. If minority voters vote for all Vm minority candidates in the party they
have chosen, all these candidates will receive Vm preferential votes. Once all non-
rationalizable strategies by the minority have been eliminated, the majority is left with
only two undominated strategies: assign vPM = Vm + 1 votes to some party P and
vP
′
M = VM − (Vm + 1) votes to party P ′, and let majority voters vote for the same
min{π, VM } candidates in the two parties. Thus, only four possible strategy profiles
can emerge. The outcomes originating from these strategies depend on the relative
size of the majority. Let VM < 2Vm + 1. When vPm = Vm , vP ′m = 0 and vPM = Vm + 1,
vP
′
M = VM − (Vm + 1), S P = 2Vm + 1 and S P
′ = VM − (Vm + 1). As majority
candidates in P have priority in the allocation of seats (each of them receives Vm + 1
votes, while each minority candidate only receives Vm) and no minority candidate
receives any preferential vote in party P ′, the number of elected minority candidates
will be
M R1 = S P − min{π, VM } = 2Vm + 1 − min{π, VM }
Now let vPm = Vm , vP ′m = 0 and vPM = VM − (Vm + 1), vP
′
M = Vm + 1. Under
my assumption on the relative size of the two groups, VM − (Vm + 1) < Vm and
minority candidates have priority in the allocation of the S P = VM − 1 seats. All
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minority candidates will be therefore elected. The following table shows the payoffs
originating from the four strategy profiles. The strategies for the minority are shown
on the raws, those of the majority on the columns. The payoff for the minority is the
first entry in the payoff vector.16
(Vm + 1, VM − (Vm + 1)) (VM − (Vm + 1), Vm + 1)
(Vm , 0) M R1, S − M R1 Vm , S − Vm
(0, Vm ) Vm , S − Vm M R1, S − M R1
As this is a zero-sum game and M R1 < Vm , the only equilibrium is a mixed strategy
profile where the groups play each of their pure strategies with equal probability. The
expected minority representation originating from this equilibrium is then
E[M R(π)] = 1
2
M R1 + 12 Vm =
1
2
(3Vm + 1 − min{π, VM })
Now consider the case of VM = 2Vm +1. The only change with respect to the previous
case is that now, when vPm = Vm , vP ′m = 0 and vPM = VM − (Vm + 1), vP
′
M = Vm + 1,
minority and majority candidates in party P receive the same amount of preferential
votes. Thus, each of them wins one of the S P = 2Vm seats with equal probability and
the expected number of elected minority candidates in this case is therefore
M R2 = 2VmVm + min{π, VM }Vm
The modified payoff matrix is
(Vm + 1, VM − (Vm + 1)) (VM − (Vm + 1), Vm + 1)
(Vm , 0) M R1, S − M R1 M R2, S − M R2
(0, Vm ) M R2, S − M R2 M R1, S − M R1
As the mixed strategy equilibrium does not change, one obtains
E[M R(π)] = 1
2
(2Vm + 1 − min{π, VM }) + V
2
m
Vm + min{π, VM }
Proof of Proposition 4: The proof mirrors the one for Proposition 2. Denote by P the
set of parties in the country. Let VM = N (Vm + 1) and assume the majority plays
the following strategy: (i) vPM = VM/N for all P ∈ P and ii) for each party P ,
the vPM voters voting for it assign their preferential votes to the same min{VM , π}
candidates. Each party therefore contains min{VM , π} majority candidates receiving
VM/N = Vm + 1 preferential votes. As in Proposition 2, consider any assignment of
votes to parties by the minority (vPm )P∈P . Each party P wins S P = VM/N +vPm seats,
16 The underlying assumption is that the voters voting for a party assign their preferential votes to the same
candidates and vote for as many candidates representing their group as possible.
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and the number of elected majority candidates in the party will be min{S P , VM , π} =
min{S P , π}, since S P < VM . Minority candidates will win any residual seat, so that
M R = S −
∑
P∈P
min{S P , π} (7)
It remains to be shown that the right hand side of (7) is always lower than max{Vm −
(π − VM/N ), 0}. As in the proof of Proposition 2, whenever π ≥ maxP∈P S P ,
S −
∑
P∈P
min{S P , π} = 0 ≤ max{Vm − (π − VM/N ), 0}
while π ≤ minP∈P S P
S −
∑
P∈P
min{S P , π} = S − Nπ ≤ max{Vm − (π − VM/N ), 0}
when π ≥ VM/N = Vm + 1. Define the set P˜ ⊆ P as
P˜ = {P ∈ P|S P ≥ π}
and denote by |P˜| its cardinality. When minP∈P S P < π < maxP∈P S P ,
S −
∑
P∈P
min{S P , π} = S −
∑
P /∈P˜
S P − |P˜|π ≤ Vm − (π − VM/N )
By adding and subtracting VM , one can re-write
Vm − (π − VM/N ) = S − (N − 1)VMN − π
Then
S −
∑
P /∈P˜
S P − |P˜|π ≤ S − (N − 1)VM
N
− π
since for all P /∈ P˜ , VM/N ≤ S P < π .
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